Why Pakistan's Army Turns On India Every Time It Faces Internal Collapse With the Baloch insurgency, TTP attacks and Taliban unrest squeezing Pakistan's army from every side, a growing body of analysis warns that its historical playbook, seen again in the Pahalgam attack, is to strike India whenever it faces an internal crisis. The morning of March 11, 2025, when Baloch insurgents hijacked the Jaffar Express, was one more sign of the deep unrest simmering inside Pakistan. That same period, a former Indian diplomat who had spent years tracking Pakistan-related affairs had privately warned that a major terror attack on India was imminent. Barely six weeks later, that warning came true when 26 tourists were killed in Pahalgam, singled out and shot dead simply because they had been identified as Hindu on the basis of their religion. A Pakistani Army Besieged On Every Front This week, a fresh analysis by Sushant Sarin argued that Pakistan's cornered military establishment could even risk a short war with India, an argument that deserves serious attention rather than dismissal. Pakistan's military system is facing one of the heaviest bouts of internal pressure in its history right now. As Sarin writes, a sudden surge in insurgent attacks in restive Balochistan province has forced the army-dominated hybrid system to confront the widening gap between its own ambitions and the reality on the ground. That pressure is visible on multiple fronts at once. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, keeps inflicting damage on the Pakistani military. The Baloch insurgency is more organised, bolder and deadlier than it has ever been before. The Taliban regime in Kabul, once treated by Pakistan as a strategic asset, has turned into a strategic burden instead. Militant groups that Rawalpindi itself once nurtured have now turned their weapons on Pakistan. Even inside PoK, public anger has reached levels never seen before. For an institution that has long cast itself as Pakistan's final guardian, this is not merely a security challenge, it is an existential one. History shows that whenever Pakistan's army finds itself cornered at home, its instinctive response has been to plot a terror attack against neighbouring India. Nothing unites Pakistan's fractured politics quite like the fear of a Hindu India, and external confrontation becomes a kind of medicine for internal breakdown. Why Blaming India Is An Old Pakistani Habit This tendency runs deep in Pakistan's strategic culture, and it is not a new phenomenon. Author C Christine Fair writes in her book Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War that Pakistan's military views internal divisions within the country not as a product of its own failures but as the outcome of Indian interference, whether that interference is real or entirely imagined. In this worldview, internal fault lines remain mere possibilities until New Delhi is seen as exploiting them. As she writes, by insisting these fissures would otherwise not be a problem, Pakistan's army can pretend to focus on domestic threats while keeping its conventional military posture against India fully intact. In other words, blaming India has become an institutional doctrine for Pakistan rather than a convenient political excuse. Even after the crushing defeat of 1971, when more than 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered to the Indian Army and Bangladesh was formed as a separate country, Pakistan's establishment pointed outward instead of looking inward at its own conduct. Lieutenant General A A K Niazi, in his 2009 book The Betrayal of East Pakistan, criticised West Pakistan's political leadership but also blamed Hindus in East Pakistan for misleading local Muslims in the name of Bengali nationalism. Even the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, set up by the Pakistani government on December 26, 1971 to examine the causes of the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the separation of East Pakistan, could not stop itself from assigning a large share of responsibility to India's alleged influence over more than one and a half crore Hindus living in East Pakistan at the time. Rather than confronting structural failures, military excesses and political blunders, the theory of external conspiracy became a convenient substitute for introspection. Over time, this habit of blaming external causes for internal failures has only deepened further. The Fortress Of Islam Mindset And The Culture Of Martyrdom Reaching for external excuses comes naturally to Pakistan because it sees itself as Qila-e-Islam, the Fortress of Islam, an entity born in opposition to a Hindu India. Pakistan's army regards itself as the guardian not just of the country's geographical borders but of its ideological ones too, playing the role of both the army of the state and the army of Allah at the same time. That is why Brigadier Saifi Ahmed Naqvi wrote in the Pakistan Army's 1994 Green Book that a Pakistani soldier's highest motivation is fighting for the cause of Islam. Ideals such as jihad, ghazi and shaheed remain integral to the army's institutional thinking even today, decades later. Author Maria Rashid, in her book Dying to Serve: Militarism, Affect and the Politics of Sacrifice in the Pakistan Army, uncovers another, more human side of this culture of martyrdom. She shows that martyrdom sits at the very centre of the army's mindset, and that everything changes for the man himself once he is martyred, both his standing in society and his place within his own family. Marital strain becomes common, family support tends to fade over time, and marriages sometimes break down altogether, especially where the couple has no children. Another key observation she makes is that public support for war inside Pakistan runs far higher when the enemy is India, compared to when the army has to fight its own Muslim citizens, such as the TTP or Baloch insurgents. How Big Is The Risk Going Forward Put together, the picture that emerges is stark. Unrest smouldering from Balochistan to PoK, an increasingly aggressive TTP, the burden of the Taliban regime in Kabul, and the army's own ideology of martyrdom all combine to create conditions in which history could easily repeat itself. Pahalgam is the latest and most painful link in that long chain of events. Just as Pakistan's establishment pointed fingers at India rather than introspecting after the 1971 defeat, a cornered Pakistani army today may once again find that opening a front against India is the easiest way to distract from its own internal unravelling. What this means for you This analysis does not change any policy or prices directly, but it speaks to how alert security agencies and ordinary citizens need to stay. • Across India: The pattern of Pakistan's rising internal military pressure could push security agencies to step up vigilance and intelligence monitoring nationwide. • In Jammu and Kashmir: Travellers visiting tourist spots like Pahalgam would do well to stay updated on security advisories and local administration guidance before their trip. Questions & Answers 1. How many tourists were killed in the Pahalgam attack and when? 26 tourists were killed in Pahalgam, roughly six weeks after the Jaffar Express hijacking, because they had been identified as Hindu on the basis of their religion. 2. When and by whom was the Jaffar Express hijacked? Baloch insurgents hijacked the Jaffar Express on March 11, 2025. 3. What does Sushant Sarin's analysis argue? He argues that Pakistan's cornered military establishment could even risk a short war with India. 4. What internal threats is Pakistan's army facing right now? TTP attacks, a growing insurgency in Balochistan, the burden of the Taliban regime in Kabul, and public anger in PoK are all squeezing the army at once. 5. How does the 1971 war connect to this pattern? Even after more than 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered and Bangladesh was formed, Pakistan's establishment blamed India instead of introspecting. 6. What was the Hamoodur Rahman Commission? It was the commission set up by the Pakistani government on December 26, 1971 to examine the causes of the 1971 war and the separation of East Pakistan. 7. What do C Christine Fair's and Maria Rashid's books argue? Fair's book shows Pakistan's army blames India for internal divisions, while Rashid's book focuses on the army's culture of martyrdom and its effect on soldiers' families. 8. Does this analysis suggest another attack on India is likely? The article argues that history shows Pakistan's army tends to plot attacks against India when cornered internally, though this remains a future risk rather than a confirmed event. https://trendkia.com/en/pakistan/pakistani-sena-jaba-bhitara-se-ghirati-hai-to-nishana-india-kyon-banata-hai-8108 TrendKia — Har trend, sabse pehle.