# CBI Steps In as 10.24 Crore Rupee Deposit Fraud Hits Punjab National Bank Branch in Greater Noida

> The Central Bureau of Investigation has launched an inquiry into an alleged 10.24 crore rupee embezzlement at a Punjab National Bank branch in Greater Noida. A female bank employee allegedly tapped colleagues' login credentials to siphon funds and prematurely liquidate fixed deposits over three years.

**Type:** article · **Category:** Uttar Pradesh · **Published:** 2026-10-30 · **Source:** TrendKia
**Canonical:** https://trendkia.com/en/uttar-pradesh/greater-noida-ke-punjab-national-bank-men-10-24-karora-rupaye-ki-vittiya-herapheri-cbi-ne-snbhali-paratala-53498 · **Language:** English
**Tags:** PNB Bank Fraud, Greater Noida, CBI Investigation, Bank Embezzlement, Core Banking Fraud, Punjab National Bank

A high-stakes financial swindle has rocked the banking sector in Uttar Pradesh after substantial sums disappeared from consumer accounts at the Punjab National Bank branch in Sector Pi, Greater Noida. The Central Bureau of Investigation has formally taken over the probe following allegations that unauthorized withdrawals totaling approximately 10.24 crore rupees took place under the radar for nearly three years. Initial inquiries carried out internally by the financial institution pointed to suspicious operations involving an internal employee alongside several external associates.

## Routine Passbook Update Exposes Covert Transactions
The intricate scheme unraveled purely by chance when an account holder named Sangeeta visited the Sector Pi facility accompanied by her husband and daughter to update her physical passbook. Upon scanning the newly printed entries, she noticed three unfamiliar debit entries executed on September 16, 2026, totaling a large amount that she had never sanctioned. When she sought immediate clarification and requested an audience with the branch manager, the senior executive was absent from the premises.

Stepping into the situation, branch employee Deepanshi intervened and attempted to legitimize the disputed withdrawals. Once the matter reached the returning branch manager, administrative questioning ensued. Deepanshi claimed that the customer had verbally authorized the transactions during a telephonic discussion with her husband, directing funds toward real estate acquisitions via an account held by one Ashutosh Pathak. Nevertheless, the management discovered that mandatory physical vouchers, signed authorizations, and supporting paper records were completely missing from branch archives, triggering alarm across the supervisory tier.

## Internal Confession Highlights Systemic Credential Abuse
Confronted with the absence of transaction trails during subsequent administrative inquiries, Deepanshi reportedly admitted that she had orchestrated the unapproved transfers at the behest of Ashutosh Pathak. To bypass operational barriers, she had exploited the CBS login identifiers and passwords belonging to other branch personnel. She further conceded to destroying the associated physical paper vouchers because no formal customer consents or administrative managerial sanctions existed for those transfers.

A background scrutiny of Ashutosh Pathak's beneficiary account revealed that Deepanshi had personally handled its creation at the branch. Financial tracing indicated that money siphoned from various customer balances moved either directly into Pathak's ledger or trickled through intermediary accounts registered under Pradeep Kumar, Membanti Devi, Priyanka Kumari, Shanti Devi, Shalini, and Saroj Devi. Multiple cash withdrawals were subsequently executed through these secondary routes.

## Six Bank Officials' CBS Credentials Compromised
Audits into the core banking infrastructure uncovered that Deepanshi had allegedly leveraged the operational CBS user credentials of six branch colleagues. The identities utilized included senior branch manager Nisha Tirkey, senior customer service associate Sandeep Prakash Sharma, customer service associate Meenakshi, Satish Kumar, relationship manager Shailendra Kumar, and officer Lovely Jain. Technical system logs and activity journals reflected that numerous unapproved transactions had been processed through these profiles. Federal sleuths are currently ascertaining whether these credentials were operated with the tacit awareness of the named personnel or harvested without their knowledge.

## Disabled SMS Alerts and Manipulated Fixed Deposits
To prevent immediate detection by account holders, the perpetrators reportedly tampered with customer profile notifications. Automated SMS alerts tied to banking transactions were systematically turned off or modified. Consequently, victims remained completely unaware of debits as funds exited their balances, allowing the illicit conduct to continue unchallenged over multiple financial cycles.

The operation also heavily targeted fixed deposits. Preliminary investigations established that several existing customer term deposits were altered to induct Ashutosh Pathak and affiliated parties as joint account holders. Once beneficiary payout mandates were changed, the deposits were liquidated before maturity. The proceeds stemming from these premature closures were then swiftly directed into designated suspect ledgers.

## 10.24 Crore Rupee Siphoning and Disputed FD Tally
In its formal legal complaint, Punjab National Bank outlined that initial internal audits had pinned unauthorized debits at around 10.24 crore rupees across various customer ledgers. The institution asserts that Deepanshi collaborated with Ashutosh Pathak, Pradeep Kumar, Membanti Devi, Priyanka Kumari, Shanti Devi, Shalini, Saroj Devi, and unidentified conspirators throughout a three-year span. Because reconciliations of customer deposits remain underway, officials noted that the tally of aggrieved clients and the aggregate quantum of embezzled funds could escalate.

Attached to the banking complaint was an audit inventory outlining irregular activity across 49 specific fixed deposit accounts liquidated and siphoned over time. The aggregate volume documented in this specific annexure stood at 7023.77 lakh rupees. This metric remains distinct from the 10.24 crore rupee sum specified in the primary complaint text, leaving investigators to map out the exact correlation and net loss between these two balance sets.

## Financial Coercion and Background Debts Claimed
Documentation tied to the competent authority's prosecution sanction incorporates statements provided by Deepanshi on October 10, 2026. She claimed a prior acquaintance with Ashutosh Pathak, alleging that he had previously defrauded her father of roughly 15 to 20 lakh rupees. Pathak subsequently persuaded her that she could recover the sunken family funds by providing additional capital, prompting her to secure personal credit lines of 4 to 5 lakh rupees to invest with him.

According to her recorded narrative, this financial enticement escalated into participating in illicit account diversions utilizing fellow staff members' administrative logins. However, investigative agencies emphasize that individual liabilities, personal culpability, and genuine motivations will only be established after thorough scrutiny of electronic logs and hard financial records.

## Anti-Corruption Branch Directs Inquiry Under DSP Akhtar
Punjab National Bank chief manager Ajay Kumar Pandey formally registered the institution's grievance on October 23, 2026, with the CBI Anti-Corruption Branch situated in Ghaziabad, following statutory approvals under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The central agency subsequently instituted regular FIR number RC1202026A0013 on October 29, 2026.

The criminal complaint invokes Sections 61(2), 316, 318, and 344 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, read alongside Sections 43 and 66 of the Information Technology Act, as well as Sections 13(1)(a) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act against Deepanshi, Ashutosh Pathak, and various unidentified private individuals and public servants. Federal leadership has assigned the investigation to DSP Dr. Zahir Akhtar. Punjab National Bank has committed to furnishing all electronic records, server logs, and paper archives as federal interrogations continue.

## What this means for you
This significant banking fraud highlights the critical need for depositors to actively monitor their savings and term deposits.

- **Across India:** The incident demonstrates that depositors must remain vigilant about account maintenance rather than assuming internal controls are foolproof. Bank customers nationwide should routinely confirm that their registered mobile alert services are active and immediately report any unexpected silence in debit SMS notifications.
- **In Greater Noida:** Patrons of the Sector Pi branch and surrounding areas should promptly visit the facility to reconcile their passbooks and physical fixed deposit certificates. Anyone detecting unauthorized debits occurring over the past three years should file formal written grievances to initiate claims for reimbursement.
- **For Fixed Deposit Holders:** Long-term depositors and senior citizens must regularly verify the joint holding patterns and maturity instructions on their term deposits. Any unapproved addition of secondary holders or unauthorized premature liquidation demands immediate escalation to regional banking ombudsmen.
- **For Digital Banking Users:** Customers should make a habit of downloading periodic account statements to review all debit entries thoroughly. If any unfamiliar third-party beneficiary appears linked to an account profile, account holders should freeze digital access through helpline services immediately.

## Why this happened
This multi-crore embezzlement occurred due to compromised internal banking controls, credential sharing, and manipulated notification systems. The formal findings outline key operational lapses that enabled the scheme.

- **Compromised CBS Credentials:** The accused bank staffer managed to obtain and exploit the core banking login credentials of six colleagues across different managerial ranks. This breakdown in administrative password security allowed a single operator to bypass dual-control authorizations and validate transactions unilaterally.
- **Destruction of Paper Vouchers:** Standard debit vouchers and written client mandates were systematically eliminated after transactions were pushed through the digital core banking terminal. The failure of routine end-of-day branch audits to reconcile physical vouchers with processed debit entries prolonged the fraud.
- **Suppression of SMS Alerts:** The perpetrators altered or suppressed automated transaction alert notifications linked to the targeted accounts. By severing the communication link between the bank and its account holders, withdrawals remained concealed from depositors for nearly three years.
- **Alleged Personal Coercion and Background Traps:** Statements recorded during early inquiries indicate that the primary external beneficiary lured the staffer into the operation under the pretext of recovering earlier financial losses incurred by her family. Federal investigators are currently verifying whether these personal motives or broader conspiratorial gains drove the operation.

## Questions & Answers

### 1. Which bank branch is involved in the Greater Noida embezzlement case?
The case involves the Sector Pi branch of Punjab National Bank located in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh.

### 2. What is the total amount allegedly siphoned from the accounts?
Initial complaints cite unauthorized debits of approximately 10.24 crore rupees, while separate records involving 49 fixed deposits totaling 7023.77 lakh rupees are also being examined.

### 3. How was the financial irregularity originally uncovered?
The incident came to light when an account holder named Sangeeta visited the branch to update her physical passbook and detected three unapproved debit entries.

### 4. Who is the primary bank staff member named in the complaint?
A bank employee named Deepanshi is accused of using the login IDs and passwords of six fellow officials to divert client deposits to external accounts.

### 5. Under which statutory provisions has the CBI registered the FIR?
The FIR invokes Sections 61(2), 316, 318, and 344 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Sections 43 and 66 of the IT Act, and Sections 13(1)(a) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

### 6. Which investigating officer is leading the federal inquiry?
The Central Bureau of Investigation has assigned the investigation to Deputy Superintendent of Police Dr. Zahir Akhtar.

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